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This study proposed an examination of the Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to ascertain whether or not 
the intent of the 1974 act had been implemented with special 
regard to spending controls, and what effect the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (the 
Gramm/Rudman Act) had on the efforts of Congress to control 
spending, namely, the deficit. The basis for this work 
included a review of the budget process, a description of 
the two budget acts, their legislative histories, and any 
relevant literature on the subject. The Gramm/Rudman act 
was then tested for its future likelihood of bringing 
spending controls within the designs of Congress; this was 
impaired by the fact that the act is so new as to have f~w 
scholarly appraisals. 
Based on available data, the act was assessed as 
probably achieving the secondary intent of the act--deficit 
reduction--but was not seen as likely to achieve its 
ultimate purpose of a balanced budget. Further study of the 
1985 act is warranted. 
I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to all the 
people who assisted me in this work and during my stay here 
at Oklahoma State University. In particular, I am 
especially indebted to my major advisor, Dr. Joseph 
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oversight of this project. 
I also wish to express my thanks to the other members 
of my committee, Professor Harold Sare and Dr. Jim Davis, 
for their advisement in the course of this work. 
My parents, Dr. Franklin D. and Betty K. Baker, deserve 
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prolonged academic endeavors, as does my husband, Carl c. 
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A. Statement of Problem 
The specific problem focused upon in this thesis is 
whether or not the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 successfully accomplished one of its specific purposes: 
spending control. 
1. Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
relationship between the intent of Congress in creating the 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the actual 
outcome of budget resolutions since the 1974 act was passed. 
Specifically, this particular study will focus on the 
congressional intent in the 1974 act to control spending, 
and Congress' ability in subsequent budgets to achieve this 
objective. For this purpose, the term "spending control" 
refers to the intent, as expressed by Congress in passing 
the act, to "bring revenue and spending decisions together," 
to control backdoor spending, to directly control budgetary 
outlays, to determine how much would actually be spent in a 
year, short of the debated "fixed ceilings" approach to 
budgeting, and finally, to discontinue the process of 
1 
"continuing resolutions."l Finally, this study will analyze 
the impact of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (hereafter referred to as the Gramm-
Rudman Act) upon the budget process, and will speculate 
about its future potential for achieving the intended 
purpose of the 1974 Act. 
2. Methodology (Research Design) 
The specific research design needed to support such 
objectives is one that first, previews and analyzes the 
existing budget process. Redeeming features of the act 
should be measured for the success that they bring to the 
total budget process. Failures of the process--especially 
spending failures--must be exposed as well for the insights 
that they can offer toward improvement of the 1974 act and 
the process itself. Close analysis of the 1974 act, its 
legislative history, and books and articles discussing the 
results of the 1974 act upon the budget process are 
particularly essential to this study if the desired purposes 
are to be achieved; this is the subject of Chapter Two. 
Once a thorough analysis of the 1974 act is completed, 
testing of the process with the new Gramm-Rudman Act is best 
accomplished through not only a consultation of the 
legislative history of the act (especially when that history 
is limited due to its hurried consideration), but must be 
supported by as many experienced and knowledgeable expert 
2 
opinions as are available. This is the subject of Chapters 
Three and Four. Chapter Five contains a discussion of the 
implications of the 1985 act and summarizes the content of 
the thesis. This brings us to a consideration of the 
assumptions and limitations necessitated by such an 
approach. 
3. Assumptions and Limitations 
Fortunately for this study, assumptions about the 1974 
act, its specific intent of controlling spending, and its 
failure to achieve that goal were not needed. Assumptions 
required to complete this study concern the 1985 act's 
procedural and political implications for addressing 
spending and the budget process. Limitations which could 
not have been avoided primarily occurred due to a heavy 
reliance upon sources which could quickly assemble, analyze, 
and report "first" observations about the new 1985 process. 
Most importantly, these sources tended to be newspapers such 
as the Washington Post which have a proven ability to 
observe changes in government and assess these for 
subsequent impacts upon the budget process in general. 
While the limitations on the study are very closely 
associated with the assumptions made herein, one particular 
limitation arises above the rest. Very often it would 
cripple a scholarly study to have very little scholarship on 
which to base future spending assumptions and theories. 
This study acknow_edges the fact that this alleged 
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deficiency exists, but argues against it convincingly 
through the use of congressional testimonies and hearings, 
as well as stua~e~ conducted from within Congress by members 
themselves. 
B. Brief History of Budget Process 
The Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was a 
first step in budget history for Congress. The act's 
purpose was designed to enable Congress to regain control 
over the budget process and also enable it to walk away from 
its previous pattern of rubber stamping the President's 
budget. While the act was a notable step in the right 
direction, Congress still has many difficulties with control 
over budget matters; many attempts to amend the process have 
been proposed. The first attempt to amend the process came 
about even as early as post-Civil War times. Prior to this 
time, one House Committee, the Ways and Means Committee, was 
the sole committee responsible for the entire budget 
process. This changea as the overall United States 
government increased in size and complexity. Eventually, 
the revenue and spending tasks were divided, with the Ways 
and Means Committee still controlling the revenue and 
Federal borrowing aspects of the budget (along with the 
Finance Committee in the Senate) while the newly formed 
Appropriations Committees oversaw the handling of 
expenditures. Only ab0ut twenty years passed before the 
process was even further fragmented due to legislative 
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committees assuming responsibility for handling eight of 
thirteen appropriations bills. 
The first Congressional attempt to reform or unify the 
budget process began in 1921. The Budget and Accounting Act 
of 1921 created a Bureau of the Budget and required that the 
executive submit a budget plan to Congress (thus taking out 
of the Treasury's hands the submission of individual 
agency's budgets). Realizing the power that this provided 
the Presidential branch of government, Congress sought to 
balance this power by arming the Appropriations Committees 
with the task of monitoring budget proposals of all 
committees. Finally, the act established the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) to check on Congressional spending. 
The Congress continued to act under this highly 
unorganized budget process until passage of the 1974 Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act. Many agencies had little or no 
idea what other agencies were doing, let alone what the 
entire government was trying to achieve as a whole; 
"backdoor spending," spending money beyond that appropriated 
for the year through the use of credit, was a very common 
practice. The first impetus which spearheaded Congress into 
specific action about changing this exceptionally loose 
system was provided by President Richard M. Nixon. Taking 
advantage of Congress' disorganized budget process, he 
created the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970 as 
a part of the executive office of the President. A control 
and screening device for the executive branch, this office 
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was largely responsible for pushing the budget 
responsibility off the unorganized and fragmented Congress 
into the waiting hands of just one man. As the fathers of 
the Constitution realized, however, this centralization of 
so much power in one branch of government was not in the 
people's best interest. In addition to having the authority 
over each agency's budget needs, the President also assumed 
responsibility for withholding funds which were already 
authorized an agency as well (impoundment). This most often 
occurred with agencies or programs which were not favorable 
with the President. Congress quickly put a stop to this 
action with Title X of the 1974 Act. Congress also used 
this Act as a method to greatly enhance its position and 
regain the precious budget powers it had surrendered.2 
c. Review of Relevant Literature 
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1. Current Budget Process 
Many longstanding works exist which review the current 
overall budget process. The more meaningful works in this 
section are written not only by budget scholars, but budget 
scholars who have practical knowledge of how Congress 
arrives at its fiscal year budgets. Such works include a 
collection of essays entitled Public Budgeting: Programs, 
Planning, and Evaluation by Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. 
Mills, 3rd Ed.; a book by LanceT. LeLoup entitled Budgetary 
Politics: Dollars, Deficits, Decisions; and a work very 
similar in nature to LeLoup's, the fundamental budget book 
book by Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary 
Process.3 These works are included in this study because of 
their keen ability to analyze the political inner-workings 
of the budget process. For example, Wildavsky states in the 
preface to the third edition, "The evident volatility of 
these fiscal and budgetary processes, the visible pulling 
and hauling that goes on, suggests to some an irrational 
political process in which popular priorities became 
perverted."4 He proves his point with such notable examples 
as the strategies used to "capitalize on the fragmentation 
of power in national politics," where he exposes the 
financial gains made by agencies in their budgets when they 
"use an authorization as a club over the head of the 
appropriations committees by pointing to a substantive 
committee as a source of commitment to ask for funds."S Two 
additional works which are of similar nature include The 
Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress by 
Richard F. Fenno, Jr.; and Congress and the Budget by Joel 
Havemann.6 
Certain works used to explain the overall budget 
process are noted here for their thoroughness and 
conciseness. Allen Schick's Congress and Money: Budgeting, 
Spending and Taxation is one such work because of its 
illustrations about the process, "It can be said that the 
budget process serves two rather different functions: It is 
at once the process by which some decisions are made and the 
process by which some decisions are accounted for 
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financially and recorded."? The other work of mention in 
this light is Lance T. LeLoup's The Fiscal Congress: 
Legislative Control of the Budget primarily because of its 
discussions of the House and Senate Budget Committees, the 
impact of budget reform, and its final chapter regarding 
Congress, the President, and the power of the purse.8 A 
final book by Allen Schick, Reconciliation and the 
Congressional Budget Process, was used to explain the 
reconciliation process, specifically, its attempt to limit 
spending in 1981, through the omnibus_ Reconciliation Act of 
1980 (P.L. 96-499). Two final works were relied on as a 
basis for understanding attempts to achieve a balanced 
budget and the consequence of deficits: Balanced Budgets, 
Fiscal Responsibility, and the Constitution, coauthored by 
Richard E. Wagner and Robert D. Tollison, and The Deficit 
Dilemma: Budget Policy in the Reagan Era, by Gregory B. 
Mills and John c. Palmer.10 
2. Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
Materials of special interest which discuss the 1974 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act include several articles 
with good, specific criticisms of the act. The first of 
these is an article by Allen Schick, written when the act 
was first introduced, which makes in-depth statements such 
as, "The budget control legislation forges a compromise that 
allows Congress to express its sense as to the totals, but 
to proceed in a contrary manner when it acts on individual 
8 
spending bills. The pieces would be reconciled at the 
termination of the budget process and it is at this point 
that the procedure specified in H.R. 7130 and s. 1541 may 
result in prolonged strife or deadlock."ll Other materials 
criticize the process for its faults, but overall, judge the 
act as a success. Such articles include "The 1974 
Congressional Initiative in Budget Making" by James J. 
Finley, Michael E. Levy, and Delos R. Smith's "The 
Congressional Budget Process Again Reformed," and 
"Perspectives on Proposals for Budget Process Reform" by 
Donald w. Moran. Moran states that any questions about 
whether the budget process "works" should be directed 
towards looking at whe~n~r the consequences of its workings 
result in needs for procedural reform. Moran says that the 
1974 Act is one such successful reform attempt which was 
needed, in spite of its shortcomings.l2 James Thurber 
explains the act's shortcomings in his article "The Future 
of the Congressional Budget Process" as uncontrolled 
spending, missed deadlines, and an overly complex process 
·which dominates too much of Congress' time, to the detriment 
of equally deserving legislation. In spite of these 
problems with the act, however, Thurber and the other budget 
scholars that he cites in the article, such as Allen Schick 
and John Ellwood, deny that 'the act is a total failure which 
must be abandoned. The lone scholar which feels that the 
act needs to be completely abandoned is Louis Fisher who 
argues that attempting to reform the act only leads to a 
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false sense of having fixed what is really wrong with the 
process and adopting reforms that do not provide relief.l3 
One final scholar who argues that the process is a complete 
failure which must be abandoned is Jerome A. Miles in "The 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act: A 
Departmental Budget Officer's View." Miles contends that 
the act was never designed to hold down spending despite the 
fact that he lists among the act's stated purposes the fact 
that Congress is to make a yearly determination of the 
appropriate levels of federal revenues and expenditures. 
Miles' criticism is especially weak when the Congressional 
Record is consulted on this point, because it reveals that 
congress was especially concerned with finding a means to 
control runaway spending.l4 
:l. Gramm/Rudman/Hollings Act of 1985 
Due to the newness of this act, most materials of any 
worth regarding the act are from two principle sources, 
newspapers (most often, the Washington Post) and the 
Congressional Record. For the legislative history of the 
act and its intent, the days in the Congressional Record 
representing floor debate of the act are especially helpful. 
Documents useful for researching the act's provisions 
include the Congressional Record, October 9, 1985, "(Special 
Report of the Democratic Study Group of the House of 
Representatives, October 6, 1985): The Gramm-Rudman 
Proposal;" Thomas s. Foley's "Whip Issue Summary: The Gramm-
10 
Rudman Amendment;" and the u.s. House of Representatives 
Democratic Study Group "Fact Sheet: The Gramm-Rudman 
Compromise: The Deficit Control Act," since other scholarly 
evaluations of what the act contains are yet unavailable. 
Besides these articles which provide little substantive 
evaluation of the act, there are some specific articles 
which analyze the procedural aspects of the act. These 
include an article by Warren B. Rudman entitled "The 
Amendment Works: A Reply to Bill Bradley" which states that 
the new act does not alter Congress's "fiscal priorities" or 
the congressional/presiden~~al balance of powers.16 A good 
article for analyzing the act's constitutionality is the 
u.s. Senate Republican Pol~cy Committee's Memorandum 
(Revised) to Senator William L. Armstrong from Lincoln 
Oliphant, Policy Committee Legislative Counsel, re: Is the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Amendment Constitutional?17 The 
director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) warns, in 
an article by Edward Walsh, that the new process gives 
unelected officials such as himself too much power because 
the CBO is responsible for issuing the report helping to 
determine whether across-the-board cuts will be needed.18 
Finally, there is an article by Stuart E. Eizenstat stating 
that the act is procedurally flawed because it gives the 
President too much of the power of the purse through its 
sequestration provisions.19 
Other articles denote political problems with the act. 
Allen Schick in "The Balanced-Budget Boomerang: Expect 
11 
Deferred or Larger Deficits Under Gramm-Rudman" argues that 
the act will not balance the budget, will lead to major 
defense cutbacks, will make spending less controllable, and 
would require hefty tax increases.20 A similar article by 
Robert Lekachman suggests that the act causes recessions to 
become depressions.21 Most of the availaOL~ ~~ticles about 
Gramm-Rudman make essentially these same arguments. 
12 
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CHAPTER II 
CURRENT BUDGET PROCESS AS ESTABLISHED 
BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL 
ACT OF 1974 
In 1973, the Joint Study Committee of the u.s. Congress 
issued a report based on its findings that the existing 
budget system of Congress was in dire need of reform. 
Titles I and II of the act further establish the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO); its primary function is 
to assist the budget committees, and specifically, functions 
as a scorekeeper on spending and tax legislation. On 
April 1st of each year, it reports on the condition of 
current fiscal policy and suggests priorities for the next 
year. Its director is appointed by the Speaker of the House 
and President Pro Tern of the Senate after reviewing the 
recommendations made by both budget committees. 
Title III of the Act establishes what has become a very 
rigorous timetable for completion of all aspects of the 
budget process; this was felt to be a very important part of 
the Act because Congress had become notoriously slow in 
getting the budget phases completed in time for the new 
fiscal year. The timetable for the provisions of the act 
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fiscal year to October 1st, and provided for the President 
to submit a current services budget (budget authority and 
outlays) on or before November lOth. The current services 
budget estimates the levels of budget authority and outlays 
needed to continue current programs and services as they are 
according to existing law. Additionally, increases in 
outlays due to an increased number of qualifying 
beneficiaries, an increase allowable for cost-of-living-
adjustments, and increases due to rising costs are added to. 
the total budget. This budget provides Congress with an 
early indication of what budget needs are. This also gives 
Congress an indication of the budget picture for the coming 
years. The President is to have his budget submitted to 
Congress by the 15th day after Congress convenes; this is 
typically done in the annual State of the Union Address. 
Committees and Joint Committees are to submit their budget 
recommendations to Congress on or before March 15th. This 
is two weeks prior to the date (on or before April 1st) when 
CBO must have its report in to the Budget Committees, and is 
one month in advance of the deadline for the Budget 
Committees to report the first concurrent resolution on the 
budget to their respective chambers (April 15th). This 
concurrent resolution contains budget authority and outlays 
for the next fiscal year in total and for each major 
functioning part of the budget as Table II illustrates, 
page 18 following. Also continued in the report are an 









TOTAL BUDGET OUTLAY BY FUNCTION 
1976-1991* 
(in millions of dollars) 
(eat,) (eat,) (eet.) (eet.) (eat.) (eat.) 
1976 1911 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
89,6U 97,241 104,49S 116,342 133,995 157,513 185,309 209,901 227,412 252,748 265,827 282,238 299,129 322,282 344,826 366,284 
6,433 6, 353 7,482 7,459 12,714 13,104 12,300 11,848 15,876 16,116 11,141 18,619 18,259 18,037 17,452 11,715 
250 General Science, 4,373 4,736 
Space 6o Tech. 
4,926 5,2lS 5,832 6,469 7,200 7,935 8,317 8,627 8,899 9,188 9,283 10,162 11,048 11,668 
270 Energy 4,204 5,110 7,992 9,180 10,U6 15,166 13,527 9,353 7,086 5,685 4,433 4,011 4,520 3,947 3,697 3,889 
300 Natural Resource• 8,184 10,032 10,983 12,135 13,858 13,568 12,998 12,672 12,593 11,157 12,905 11,958 11,794 11,658 11,206 10,652 
and Eoviron.ent 
350 Aariculture 
370 Coaauce and 
Housing Credit 
400 Tno•portation 
450 eo-unity and 
Regional Devl. 
500 Educ. 1 Training, 




3,170 6,787 ll,J57 11,236 8,839 11,323 15,944 22,901 13,613 25,565 25,811 19,541 19,668 18,892 15,445 ll,431 
7,619 3,093 6,254 4,686 9,390 8,206 6,256 .,681 6,917 4,229 3 1802 1,359 l,Bll - 480 - 958 - 1,769 
13,739 14,829 15,521 11,532 21,329 23,379 20,625 2l;Jllt 23,669 25,838 27,106 25,533 24,115 23,375 23,726 23,075 
5,442 7,021 ll,841 10,480 11,252 10,568 8,347 -1!560 7,673 7,680 7,922 6,525 5,452 4,968 5,184 5,182 
18,910 21,104 26,110 30,223 31,843 33,709 27,029 26,606 27,579 29,342 30~671 27,447 26,312 26,430 26,039 25,964 
15,134 17,302 18,524 20,494 23,169 26,866 27,445 28,641 30,411 33,542 35,669 34,997 36,659 37,947 39,353 40,682 
15,834 19,345 22,768 26,495 32,090 39,149 46,567 52,588 57,540 65,822 68,661 70,234 76,041 83,022 90,508 98,368 
600 IDcome Security 60,784 61,044 61,488 66,359 86,540 99,723 107,717 122,598 112,668 128,200 118,093 118,374 123,124 125,746 128,327 132,458 
650 Social Security 73,899 85,061 93,861 104,073 118,547 139,584 155,964 170,724 178,223 188,623 200,053 212,2ll 226,070 239,947 254,746 263,483 
700 Veteran'• 
Benefit. & Ser. 
750 Aclclintatratioo 
' Justice 
18,433 18,038 18,978 19,931 21,185 22,991 23,958 24,846 25,614 26,352 26,619 26,420 26,921 26,877 27,190 27,144 
3,324 3,602 3,810 4,169 4,582 4,762 4,703 5,099 5,660 6,217 6,788 6,948 7,011 7,061 7,131 7,223 
*Source; Historical TableaJ Budget of the U.S. Government, pp. 3.3(3)-5.1(18), 
....... 
00 
federal revenues as needed, and the level of public debt. 
The totals are non-binding targets which provide a guideline 
until passage of the second concurrent resolution on or 
about September 15. Two events happen on May 15th. 
Committees are to report bills authorizing new budget 
authority, and by this time, Congress is to have finished 
action of the first concurrent resolution. Prior to meeting 
this deadline, Congress is forbidden from considering any 
revenue, spending, entitlement, or debt legislation. If the 
House and Senate are unable to agree on this resolution 
after seven days of consideration, they report all matters 
in agreement and also in disagreement to their houses; 
debate on the conference report on this resolution is 
limited to five hours and the resolution may not be 
recommitted to committee nor reconsidered. 
One last thing is to be remembered about this 
resolution which will become important as a discussion of 
Gramm/Rudman commences. The various House and Senate 
Committees receive their allocation of total budget 
authority and outlays on this date; managers divide these 
sums among the committees with jurisdictions relevant to the 
purpose of the funds. The committees then in turn allocate 
(or, sub-allocate) these monies among the proper 
subcommittees and programs. This is to be reported to the 
Houses as soon as possible. These allocations are often 
referred to as "302(a) and 302(b)" allocations. 
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On or before the seventh day following the Labor Day 
Recess, Congress supposedly completes action on bills and 
resolutions dealing with new budget and spending authority. 
One exception to this deadline may be made for those 
appropriations bills which have not had the proper 
authorization legislation passed. What normally results as 
a consequence is that the second budget resolution (making 
all figures binding), the reconciliation process, and the 
fiscal year all lag behind schedule, causing continuing 
resolutions to be enacted. These resolutions were a primary 
source of concern when the Act was created. 
If adhering to schedule, Congress must complete action 
on the second concurrent resolution on the budget by 
September 15th, and completes the reconciliation process by 
September 25th, so that the new budget is ready at the start 
of the fiscal year on October 1st. Once this process has 
been completed, it is improper for either House to enact or 
consider legislation which would alter the authority, 
outlays, or revenues in the budget according to Title III of 
the Act, although Congress may, at any time, submit a 
revised resolution.2 All legislation after this time must 
be "neutral." 
A. Contents of the Budget Resolution 
Part one of the budget resolution consists of a "mark," 
or, formal recommendations as presented to committees to 
.begin the budget deliberation process. Specifically, these 
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marks contain a review of economic situations, an analysis 
of larger budget needs, and a consideration of each budget 
function. The second part, the "markup," consists of a 
process whereby committee members revise and amend the 
recommendations until they are ready to go to the House 
floor. Allen Schick notes that these procedures are vastly 
different between the House and Senate, with the House 
markups characterized by stringent efforts to keep party 
loyalties intact while very heated debates take place. The 
Senate, on the opposite hand, rarely is in danger of ever 
defeating a resolution, although discussions in committees 
do invoke differences of opinion.3 
B. Reconciliation 
Section 310 of the Act provides for a process of 
reconciliation. In this process, committees of Congress are 
directed to originate legislation dealing with adjusting 
revenues to fit the current government budget needs, to fix 
spending patterns, or to affix a limit on the amount of 
public debt. The purpose of reconciliation is to force 
committees to abide by their budgets. The Budget Committees 
assemble this information which is later passed on to the 
houses. Rather than attempting to deal in very specific 
expenditures, reconciliation is directed at overall totals, 
not at specific reductions in programs, nor at tax 
increases. 
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The reconciliation process, to be completed by 
September 25, requires one or more Congressional committees 
to submit legislation increasing or decreasing revenues, 
spending, or the public debt limit. The specific purpose, 
as stated briefly above is to require committees to adhere 
to spending and tax provisions established in the first 
budget resolution. All committees asked to begin 
reconciliation submit their reconciliation proposals to the 
Budget Committees which, in turn, place all these proposals 
into one so that the houses may act on them.4 
Allen Schick notes that this process was not altogether 
a successful one. He states that as designed, 
reconciliation came too late in the process to have any 
meaningful effects upon legislation. He further states that 
as a consequence of this, reconciliation failed to resolve 
inconsistencies h~tween legislation and overall 
Congressional budget policies.S Congress then began its 
reconciliation process earlier. The Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-499) placed into law the established 
committee practice of examining laws under their 
jurisdiction and reporting instances where savings could be 
achieved. This practice was proven successful even prior to 
passage of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act by netting a 
result of $3.1 billion in budget authority, $4.7 billion in 
budget outlays, and some $3.6 billion in other revenues.6 
In 1981, the 96th Congress, Second session, used the 
reconciliation process in a new way, directed at specific 
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savings targets. Congress reasserted itself in the budget 
process with this action, ~u the detriment of previously 
established executive budget control. Specifically, the 
1981 process moved up the reconciliation process so that it 
followed the first budget resolution and made the spending 
and revenue levels therein targets to be achieved in 
reconciliation. Reconciliation was thus applied to 
authorizations and entitlemen~~ as well as to 
appropriations. 
This use of the reconciliation process had two primary 
effects, according to Harold Wolman and Fred Teitelbaum in 
"Interest Groups and the Reagan Presidency:" 1) The fact 
that the process came about earlier meant that Congress was 
forced to reorient its spending habits from a process 
separating spending from revenue-raising measures (a 
distributive one) to one that, in one complete package, was 
voted on and considered as one total budget 
(redistributive), and 2) the process forced Congress to 
include entitlements in ~~s consideration, which to that 
time, constituted over one-half of federal spending. The 
process forced interest groups in particular to seek an 
increasing amount of resources from state and local 
gover~~ents, rather than the federal government. This 
seemingly benefited conservative interest groups in 
particular.? The process was not used in this way the 
following year, however, because it was especially feared 
that the Budget Committees with their new enforcement 
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mechanism, reconciliation, would not abide by the normal 
budget process and would dominate Congress.8 The 1981 
process represents an exception in the use of 
reconciliation, and in the budget process as well. While it 
was successful in reducing spending, the fact that the 
process was abandoned leaves its possible affect uncertain. 
Along with the spirit of that Reconciliation Act, 
special procedures were established long before the Act was 
passed to try to eliminate wastefuL spending. Section 401 
of the 1974 Act provides that three forms of "backdoor 
spending" be controlled. These three types are entitlements 
(all people who meet certain qualifications are eligible to 
receive benefits), contract authority, and borrowing 
authority. A "point of order" negating these types of 
legislation is proper unless that legislation stipulates 
that it relates to a prior appropriation. Hence, the Act 
stopped all new contract or borrowing authority outside the 
appropriations process. Two items of note about 
entitlements are 1:.uCI.t a point of order may be ra~::.cd against 
an entire bill (not simply the entitlement provision) if the 
entitlement commences on or after the first day of the 
fiscal year of the same year that entitlement was reported. 
secondly, any new entitlement which exceeds committee 
amounts for new entitlements may be sent to the 
Appropriations Committee for 15 days. The largest exemption 
of a program from these restrictions is Social Security. 
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Titles V through IX of the 1974 Act concern changes in 
the fiscal year timetable. Also, these titles pertain to 
matters such as improving budget terminology, the specifics 
of the contents of the President's budget (same as those for 
a concurrent resolution, variations not expected in last 
year's revenues and outlays, costs of any appropriations 
needed ahead of time, and presentation of the nation's needs 
and basic programs, also including a five-year budget 
projection), and prov1ae~ for studies to improve proqram 
review and evaluation via the Budget Committees. This 
budget is updated twice yearly (April 10 and July 15). 
Authorizing legislation for the year following the current 
year is due on May 15th. 
Title VI pertains to the current service budget while 
Title VII concerns GAO's attempt to analyze and report 
agency activities and programs. It is Title X dealing with 
Impoundment Control which will also be used later in 
discussing the "sequestering" approach of Gramm/Rudman. The 
Impoundment Title of this Act marks one of the most 
significant examples of Congressional reassertion in the 
budget process. Impoundment first began when Jefferson 
impounded the funds allocated for gunboats on the 
Mississippi River. The gunboats were unnecessary after a 
dispute with the French was resolved. In another case in 
1967, Congress withheld funds itself, expecting that the 
President would agree. Recent chief executives including 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Truman, and Johnson refused to spend 
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money appropriated for weapons and military forces which 
they felt were not necessary for defense. Richard Nixon's 
constant use of impoundment, however, brought the need for 
impoundment use reform. Unable to abide by Nixon's frequent 
impounding of appropriated funds, this portion of the Act 
provided that a "recission" as usea .cy the President means 
that all or part of a body's budget authority is not 
necessary for carrying out its full objectives, or, that 
budget authority should be withheld for fiscal reasons, or 
that part of one year's authority should be reserved for a 
following year. When the President takes such an action, a 
special message is to be sent to Congress requesting that 
such a recission be approved, noting the circumstances and 
reasons for the action. For the Congress to approve of such 
an act, they must act upon the matter within forty-five 
days, or the President's attempt fails, and the money is to 
be made available for spending. "Deferrals" are proposed by 
the President whenever any executive action alters the 
status of appropriated funds. Again, a special message is 
sent to Congress- describing the situation, but unlike a 
recission, Congress must pass an "impoundment resolution" 
voicing specific disapproval of the President's action. 
Motions to discharge may be issued by any member supporting 
the recission or deferral regarding the committee having 
jurisdiction. This action is upheld if the committee does 
not report an appropriate recission bill or impoundment 
resolution twenty-five days after introduction. As soon as 
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the committee is discharged, motions to proceed with the 
legislation are proper. In the event that the President 
refuses to abide by Congressional action, the Comptroller 
General, after a twenty-five day waiting period upon filing 
an explanatory statement with the chambers, is authorized to 
initiate a civil suit requesting ordered compliance. All 
Presidents must submit monthly recession, deferral, and 
reservation reports which detail reasons for the action 
being sougn"t..9 
c. Intent of 1974 Act 
In passing the 1974 Act, Congress had four major goals: 
1) "To provide for the reform of congressional procedure 
with respect to the enactment of fiscal measures," 2) "To 
provide ceilings on Federal expenditures and the national 
debt," 3) "To create a budget committee in each House," and 
4) "To create a congressional office of the budget."10 
It is readily apparent from congressional testimony 
regarding the 1974 act that its intent to control spending 
was real. Senate speeches for instance, established this 
set of goals in relation to spending as had been suggested 
by the Joint Study Committee: 
1) Relates national spending to national income, 
2) Provides a focus for major debate on spending 
priorities, 3) Provides for setting a limit on 
annual outlays, 4) Brings the bulk of new 
"backdoor spending" under Appropriations Committee 
control, 5) Provides a mechanism whereby Congress, 
not the Executive, establishes national fiscal 
policy, 6) Provides a mechanism for enacting all 
spending bills before the beginning of the fiscal 
year, and 7) Establishes new congressional 
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institutions to give Congress the expert backup we 
need.11 
This spending control priority was then incorporated by 
Congress into the statement of purposes for the act, 
sections two and four of the act, which provided for the 
"congressional determination each year of the appropriate 
level of Federal revenues and expenditures" and for the 
establishment of "national budget priorities.nl2 Spending 
prior to this act consisted of a fragmented series of 
spending and revenue decisions made by each committee 
without consulting the other committees. This led to many 
duplicate spending provisions for essentially the same 
project, and, when totaled, incrementally amounted to rising 
outlays and deficits. This act specifically represents 
Congress' attempts to curb the latter. 
Along with these new and hopeful objectives came the 
arguments for passing the act, the act "provides detailed 
scorekeeping functions for the CBO (Congressional Budget 
Office), so that the public will have complete and up-to-
date accounts of how much is being spent, and for what. For 
the first time, Congress will have the opportunity for 
public debate and votes on overall fiscal and budget policy 
and on appropriate national priorities."13 
Two key objectives in controlling runaway spending were 
sought; one was that the first concurrent resolution would 
establish appropriate spending and revenue levels so that 
surpluses or deficits could be foreseen.14 The second 
sought to give scorekeeper (or, gatekeeper) authority to CBO 
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so that Congress would be aware of its proposed actions 
during the spending process.15 An example of the 
significant increases in spending is shown by Table III, 
page 30 following. Also, backdoor spending (via contract 
authority and mandatory entitlements) was forced through the 
appropriations process.16 
This attempt to limit spending also gave Congress a 
clearer perspective on spending totals. At last, Congress 
was realizing the budgetary effects of its actions if more 
appropriations were authorized outside the budget 
resolutions.17 Interestingly enough, with serious 
consequences to this study, one proponent of the 1974 act 
even went so far as to suggest that Congress could use 
"spending ceilings," but these were not adopted for the 
reason that Congress needed a "flexible budget process.nl8 
Obviously, the act's primary concern was to find and 
establish a new budget procedure by which increased spending 
and deficits could be controlled if not eliminated. 
D. Accomplishments of the Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
In addition to passing legislation which tried to 
return the control for the power of the purse back to 
Congress, the Act did many other things which were 
considered beneficial to Congress and the budget process as 
a whole. Congress had a specific framework from which to 
draw information and coordinate information about budgets of 
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TABLE III 
TOTAL SPENDING AND REVENUES 
1976-1991* 
(in millions of Dollars 
Year Total Spending Total Revenues 
1976 371,779 298,060 
1977 409,203 355,559 
1978 458,729 399,561 
1979 503,464 463,302 
1980 590,920 517,112 
1981 678,209 599,272 
1982 745,706 617,766 
1983 808,327 600,562 
1984 851,781 666,457 
1985 946,323 734,057 
1986 estimate 979,928 777,139 
1987 estimate 994,002 850,372 
1988 estimate 1,026,765 933,179 
1989 estimate 1,063,619 996,115 
1990 estimate 1,093,848 1,058,096 
1991 estimate 1,122,716 1,124,039 
*Source: Historical Tables: Budget of the u.s. Government, 
p. 1.1(2). 
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various agencies, departments, and committees (functions). 
For the first time, it had Budget Committee "clearing 
houses" which could provide the oversight Congress had 
lacked before. John Ellwood and James Thurber point out 
that Congress even had the capabilities after passage of the 
Act to "'balance the budget'" (an item which will be 
discussed in much more detail later), "to set its own 
budgetary prerogatives, and to highlight the relationship 
between receipts and expenditures."19 The evidence for the 
Act's success is provided by Allen Schick. 
During the first five years of congressional 
budgeting, there was little real or discretionary 
growth in entitlement programs, the largest and 
fastest-growing category of uncontrollables during 
the five years before the budget process was 
implemented. The continuing growth in 
uncontrollables has been due almost entirely to 
growth in the populations covered by entitlement 
programs and the indexing as major entitlements to 
cost-of-living increases."2 
Schick goes on to say that there are three basic 
accomplishments that the budget process has achieved, such 
as the successful adoption of budget resolutions (though not 
always "on time"), the successful balancing of legislative 
interests with budget priorities, and the management of 
budgetary conflict in a proper manner when such conflict 
arises.21 
By far, the most openly successful provision of the Act 
has been Title X's success in controlling the incidences of 
Presidential impounding. As pointed out in the review of 
the Act itself, Congress plays a very big part in deciding 
31 
when, or if, the President will ever exercise this once 
extremely powerful budget weapon. 
As mentioned earlier in this study, almost all 
authors--with the notable exception of Louis Fisher who 
believes that the entire process is a marked failure and 
that any meaningful budget reform measures ought to 
recognize this and completely abandon support for the Act--
will acknowledge that the Act did bring Congress a 
tremendously long way in the direction of needed budgetary 
control and oversight; these same authors also unanimously 
malign the process for its many demonstrated failures over 
time.22 Scholars are generally not willing to totally 
abandon the Act; however, most, if given the opportunity, 
would greatly amend the current process (as is demonstrated 
on the floors of Congress). 
E. Difficulties With the Budget and 
Impoundment Control· Act of 1974 
One final redeeming aspect regarding the Act was its 
flexibility, defined by various members of Congress as the 
ability to find a process limiting spending without imposing 
"ceilings;" for without it, the Act could have imposed too 
rigid a budget process for anyone to have even considered 
abiding by. Part of the difficulties in assessing scholarly 
comments regarding the pitfalls of the process can be linked 
directly to the confusion about the method to use in 
assessing the Act. This may be cleared up by considering 
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the comments of a couple of scholars, James A. Thurber and 
Lance T. LeLoup. Thurber points out that the criteria to be 
used should consider whether the legislation allows Congress 
to " control, manage, and plan public spending and taxation, 
should it want to do so."23 Thurber then adjudges the Act 
as a success based on these criteria. In an earlier article 
written about these same types of criteria, however, Thurber 
seems to think that the process will not achieve the desired 
effects: "These five steps of policy analysis are based on 
three very large assumptions: first, that there is enough 
time to do analysis; second, that the necessary data are 
available to do analysis; and third, that someone will read 
the analysis and act upon it."24 LeLoup states that the 
criteria should consider whether "congressional independence 
in budgeting (will) mean greater accountability or greater 
fragmentation and divisiveness."25 Finally, Allen Schick 
states that "A budget process is a way of organizing work. 
It does not lead to any particular decisions."26 Louis 
Fisher (probably the most outspoken critic of the Act) 
concludes this about the process, "as we continue to play 
make-believe about the virtues of the Budget Act, it will be 
more and more tempting to adopt 'reforms' that I think most 
of us would regard as offering little relief: biennial 
budgeting, balanced-budget requirements, and the line item 
veto."27 This becomes a particularly interesting statement 
when it is considered what the Gramm/Rudman Act proposes for 
changing the system of budgeting. (Before we begin this 
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discussion of the difficulties with this act, however, one 
article is of special interest to this study. "The 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act: A 
Departmental Officer's View" by Jerome A. Miles seems to 
directly contradict this study.) Miles states, "But was the 
act ever really intended to hold down spending?"28 Two key 
arguments can be made which prove this accusation false. 
First, Miles defines only the first purpose of the act which 
states that the act strives to assure Congress' control over 
the budget process. I am not in the dispute with Miles that 
this first purpose pertains to congressional control over 
the process, not spending; certainly, this is one of the 
purposes of the act. Miles, however, continues to talk 
about this first purpose in his article, pointing out that 
Congress has been successful at controlling the process 
(yes, even Congress' power "over" the appropriations 
process). Miles fails, however, to refute the second 
purpose of the act which provides for Congress to determine 
annual fiscal revenues and expenditures. Clearly, here is 
where Congress has "fudged" in the act more than a few 
times. Secondly, simply because Congress has regained power 
"over" appropriations does not necessarily mean that 
appropriations have not been the source for budget abuse as 
many, many scholars verify. This article, for these reasons 
(and, in light of what scholars argue below), is of no 
consequence to this study. 
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Yet still, many violations of the Act are apparent, 
even in the day-to-day workings of Congress. Many are 
concerned that the overall budget process is too 
decentralized among committees.29 Others note that drastic 
spending cuts which were thought to be an essential part of 
the Act have not materialized as such, plus, national 
priorities have not been restructured as some had 
anticipated that they would be. Since this study focuses 
particularly on the failure of the 1974 act to control 
spending some spending problems should be isolated. Several 
scholars acknowledge that few of the act's original criteria 
have been met. Three criticisms seem predominant: 1) 
Deadlines for appropriations and resolutions are often 
missed, creating widespread use of "continuing resolutions" 
and "supplemental appropriations;" 2) "Backdoor spending" 
has greatly increased, and 3) Deficit control has been 
nonexistent.30 Figure 1 (page 36 following), using the 
1986 Presidential budget, shows this last criticism 
regarding runaway deficits all too well. There are 
statistics to be cited as well on the lateness of 
resolutions. 
Under the reform act, newly created budget committees 
were given authority late the next year and 86 days late the 
following year. In 1982, the preliminary resolution was 
enacted 39 days late and was given binding status because it 
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In one year, there were four resolutions. In addition 
to increased spending through continuing resolutions, there 
is the problem occurring within the appropriations process. 
Noting that the gap between what Congress authorizes 
for programs and what is actually appropriated is getting 
wider and wider, Allen Schick attributes one consequence of 
this gap to "transforming" the authorizations process from 
an evaluative type into a mechanism for increased 
spending.32 Evidence of what widens the split is found in 
the increased use of backdoor spending.33 Donald w. Moran, 
in "Perspectives on Proposals for Budget Process Reform," 
concludes the remarks about spending control failure when he 
says, 
As budget decision-making was oriented more 
and more toward structural fiscal balance rather 
than literal fiscal balance, incremental policy 
decisions produced outcomes that, due to cyclical 
factors, moved the realm of 'politically' feasible 
revenue and spending policy further and further 
apart. Hence, each cyclical swing moved the 
budgetary posture relentlessly toward chronic 
deficit finance.34 
Lastly, one scholar says this about the budget process, 
The policy impact of budget reform has been 
relatively slight. Some savings have been 
realized, but the relative allocation within the 
budget has been more stable than in the decade 
that preceded. It would be difficult to make a 
case that the budget would have looked 
significantly different without the procedural 
changes in Congress. Yet this is not a critical 
indictment of the reforms. It simply means that 
although budget priorities are more clearly 
expressed by Congress, the preferences of members 
have not changed radically since before 1975.35 
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This congressional will to change is an integral part 
of any attempt at budget reform, and will be analyzed also 
in relation to the Gramm/Rudman Act. LeLoup further expands 
upon the comments above by noting that although the Act made 
it easier for Congress to tackle tough and complex 
decisions, as well as allowing savings in expenditures, 
several problems remain apparent in the process such as 
waivers and a failure to coordinate or control revenue 
decisions. LeLoup says that most scholars fail to recognize 
the true reason for these inadequacies: the fact that 
congressional will still longs for the pork barrels and 
where to cut the other guy's programs.36 
Other particular problems of note include congressional 
failure to even abide by its own statutory legislation 
regarding the aggressive time limits sought to ensure 
expedition of the process. Time and again, Congress simply 
extends or prolongs various phases of the budget process 
because of failure to complete needed first steps.37 Most 
scholars point out that this one failure produces two more--
namely, the problems of continuing resolutions and the 
increasing incidents of "backdoor spending." 
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
of 1985 (herein referred to by its more popular name, the 
"Gramm/Rudman Act") promises to be the most far-reaching 
budget amendment act ever attempted since the 1974 act was 
passed. Additionally, the Gramm/Rudman Act was hastily 
considered in Congress and so, its full impact upon the 
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overall budget process as it now exists is very unsure. In 
order to gain a better understanding of the potential 
implications of this act, therefore, a survey of how the 
current pre-Gramm/Rudman process works is helpful. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BALANCED BUDGET AND EMERGENCY DEFICIT 
CONTROL ACT OF 1985 (THE GRAMM/ 
RUDMAN/HOLLINGS ACT) 
Combined with an action raising the national debt to 
nearly two trillion dollars, the Gramm/Rudman Act was seen 
by congressmen who voted for it as the only way to 
effectively limit the fast-rising national debt, control 
spending, and reduce deficits. The bill as passed in 
conference committee established deficit targets of $171.9 
billion for fiscal 1986, $144 billion for fiscal 1987, $108 
billion for fiscal 1988, $72 billion for fiscal 1989, $36 
billion in fiscal 1990, and a completely balanced budget by 
1991; Figure 2, following, illustrates this. The original 
House proposal would have achieved this process by 1990. 
The Senate version held off implementation, for all 
practical purposes, until the mid-term 1986 elections had 
passed so that budget cuts would be less severe until after 
the elections. House conferees were especially insistent 
that the cuts be made immediately, and ultimately, they 
prevailed. Thus, this proposal is destined to give credit 
for budget deficit reductions to Republicans, but the 
















*Source: P.L. 99-177, Section 201(a)(7) 
Figure 2. Deficit Reduction According to Gramm-Rudman 
the cuts will be so extensive as to create political furor. 
In fiscal 1987-1990, a $10 billion dollar projection of 
potential deficit would be all that is required to trigger 
the Act's automatic cuts (to be discussed later) in the 
event that Congress is unable to meet deficit reduction 
targets. The overall budget process is as follows, and 
should be compared with that of the 1974 Act in Table I 
(page 17). 
The process is initiated as far as the executive branch 
is concerned the first Monday after January 3rd, when the 
President submits his budget to Congress; currently, the 
President does not have to present his budget until 
approximately the last week in January. This is only the 
first indication of the aggressive speed in the new budget 
process. (For fiscal year 1986 only, the President has 
until February 5th). April 15th is the date on which 
Congress adopts its conference report on the first (and 
under Gramm/Rudman, the only) budget resolution. The 
current deadline is May 15th, which often is not met (giving 
one serious doubts about this even more aggressive 
deadline). On June lOth, the Appropriations Committees 
report the final appropriations legislation so that by June 
15th, Congress may complete action on all reconciliation 
legislation. In some six to seven months then, all action 
on all regular appropriations bills is completed. Under the 
conference agreement, the House could not adjourn for the 
July 4th recess unless all reconciliation and appropriations 
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bills were completed. There is, therefore, some attempt 
made to insure that these aggressive time limits are met. 
For fiscal years 1987-1991, the Congressional budget 
process begins with an August 15th evaluation of the economy 
and projected deficits for the fiscal year beginning October 
1st (as is currently the case). Both the executive branch's 
OMB and the legislative branch's CBO would be involved in an 
independent evaluation of the projected outlook for the next 
fiscal year; the item of significance, however, is that 
these are unelected political entities. Their estimation of 
the projected economic outlook is averaged in the event that 
they are in disagreement. Their reports are then forwarded 
to the GAO which forwards "sequestration" (withholding of 
appropriated funds) formulas for the entire government 
including percentages of across-the-board cuts if deemed 
necessary. The President would issue a preliminary 
sequestration order in accordance with GAO's report on 
September 1st. Congress would then have until October 1st 
to issue a revised budget resolution within the projected 
deficit guidelines. CBO and OMB would review this 
legislation by October 5th. GAO would make its calculations 
by October lOth and the President's final order would be 
issued October 15th. (During 1986, the economic forecast is 
taken January lOth, with GAO formulating its cuts by January 
20th. The President's order would be issued February 1st 
and would take effect March lst).l 
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It is by and large the "sequestration" process which 
makes Gramm/Rudman a very political, very intriguing 
balanced-budget law. As stated, the process to determine if 
sequestration is necessary begins with the OMB and CBO's 
reports August 15th, which is then submitted to the GAO for 
final action. If, in the case of fiscal 1987-1990, the 
projected deficit level is above the allowable $10 billion 
dollar limit (or, by any amount in fiscal years 1986 and 
1991), the President is required to issue an order making 
across-the-board automatic cuts for the amount in excess. 
The President's order does not become effective immediately; 
Congress has one month from its issuance to come up with an 
alternative plan of its own which meets the required limits. 
This date includes any possible Presidential approval as 
needed, or the override of a Presidential veto. If, for the 
above reasons, Congress is unable to meet either the 
deadline or the requirements, the President's order takes 
effect immediately after this one-month waiting period. 
There is contained within this legislation an 
alternative provision in the event that this provision of 
the Act is adjudged to be unconstitutional. This "fallback" 
provides that should the President claim the constitutional 
right to violate the legislation's sequestration 
requirements, any such order issued would be invalid upon a 
finding that such a claim was valid. In the opposite event, 
where it is possible that the court would find that such 
sequestration orders issued by the President in compliance 
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with the GAO report were unconstitutional, a special 
congressional joint committee, composed of both chamber's 
Budget Committees, would be formed and the GAO report would 
instead go to this body. Upon passage by Congress and 
Presidential signature, this resolution would serve to guide 
the President in making his mandated reductions.2 It should 
be remembered that this alternative process may be tested as 
well for its constitutionality. 
Briefly, an explanation of how these automatic cuts are 
to be made by the President is needed. Very early in the 
Senate debates, it was criticized that the Act was 
unconstitutional because it provided the President with too 
much legislative discretionary power in specifying which 
programs under the general budget functions would be reduced 
and by how much. At first, the President's only 
restrictions were that these cuts had to be applied evenly 
to all functional budget accounts (which contained many 
programs under each for the President to target at will), 
and that the President was forbidden to do away with an 
entire program in using the discretion (but, cuts down to 
one dollar were quite possible). These loopholes were 
eliminated in the House version which attempted to ensure 
that these cuts were made across the board in equivalent 
proportions: fifty-percent to be cut from domestic programs 
which were not exempted, and fifty-percent from unexempted 
defense programs. Basically, these cuts are made in new 
budget authority and unobligated but previously appropriated 
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authority (termed "total budgetary resources"). The latter 
term applies to defense, where there are many prior 
contracts and the like which cannot legally be terminated 
automatically without severe penalties (often, the total 
funds would have to be surrendered as penalty anyway for 
breach of contract). One final note to this process must be 
added. For fiscal year 1986, the Defense Department is 
allowed to shift cuts between accounts in some instances. 
This allows the department to make double cuts in some 
programs to lessen the blows suffered by others. There is a 
final stipulation to this exception, however, that prevents 
the department from totally closing bases or from actually 
increasing the amount of one particular program. 
There are some special provisions and exceptions to the 
Act. One such special exception to this Act concerns the 
event of recession. In the event that, at any time during 
the fiscal year, the CBO notifies Congress that either it or 
the OMB have projected a drop in " real economic growth" 
enduring for more than two consecutive calendar quarters 
(commencing with the period just prior to notification and 
ending with the fourth quarter after), an automatic vote 
would be taken in Congress to suspend the applicable deficit 
limits and the entire provisions of the Gramm/Rudman Act. 
This automatic vote would be considered as a joint 
resolution and would require Presidential signature (or a 
veto override) before becoming law. Such a process could 
also be triggered if the growth-rate statistics as published 
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by the Commerce Department show that real growth has 
declined in excess of one percent for two consecutive 
quarters. All provisions of the new Act would then become 
invalid with the lone exception that if the Presidential 
order mandating cuts had already gone into effect, the 
spending limits would still apply. It is of interest to 
note that the original House version of the Act would have 
attached the automation part of this process to economic 
growth to try to avoid potentially debilitating effects of 
spending reductions being engaged during an established 
recession. Special provisions are also in place for 
consideration of this legislation to be expedited in as 
little as five legislative days by the Budget Committees. 
Floor votes must be taken during the five day period. No 
amendments would be in order; neither would other similar 
tactics. If the two chambers fail to agree on this 
legislation, the automatic process remains in effect. Very 
similar "suspension" actions are also taken in the event 
that war is declared by Congress. 
Exemptions under the Act were limited to Social 
Security (retirement, survivors', and disability benefits), 
interest on the national debt, and cash payments under the 
earned income tax credits in the original Senate version of 
the bill. The House, however, always mindful that these 
reductions hit the hardest pressed and the least fortunate 
the worst, demanded many more exemptions to the Act and were 
largely successful due to the Republican 1986 campaign 
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hopefuls not wanting to risk hearing more Tip O'Neill 
rhetoric about the Republicans not caring for the elderly 
and less fortunate. As a consequence, the Act's automatic 
spending reductions are not uniformly applied to programs 
such as Social Security, interest on the national debt, and 
cash payments under the earned income tax credits. Such is 
also true with the programs exempted under the House version 
such as "Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), Child Nutrition, Food Stamps (including aid to 
Puerto Rico), Supplemental Security Income, Veterans' 
Pensions, Veterans' Compensation, and the special 
supplemental food program for women, infants, and children 
(WIC)."3 Additional exemptions exist elsewhere in the Act 
for community and migrant health centers and for Medicaid. 
some exemptions were made as a matter of necessity. 
These include such items as the funds available for legal 
claims against the government, the salary of the President 
and federal judges, appropriations for the District of 
Columbia (amounts from D.C. tax collections only), and prior 
payments obligated by various legal agreements.4 
Cost-of-Living Adjustments (COLA's) would suffer 
somewhat under the Act, but are not subject to as severe a 
cut as other programs might face. Basically, COLA's in 
programs such as federal retirement plans (Civil Service, 
military retirements) would be cut only to the extent of the 
COLA and no further. Should this be more than what is 
required to produce the fifty percent domestic program 
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spending cuts, these COLA's would only suffer 
proportionately with other programs. Because these programs 
come from defense as well as domestic budget sources, the 
savings from the COLA's are applied to both sides equally in 
figuring the percentage of reductions made. Certain other 
programs having the similar appearance to COLA's (the 
special milk program, for instance) are treated as COLA's 
for purposes of the Act. 
Certain enforcement provisions conclude the discussion 
of the Act. Providing mechanisms to ensure that deficit 
reductions are actually made (not just appearances on paper) 
the Act specifies the following: 1) A "point of order" may 
be raised against and will stop appropriations from going to 
programs which are listed as part of either an amendment to 
a budget resolution or a conference report on a budget 
resolution, 2) Points of order are also allowed when 
legislation is being considered wh~ch would either violate a 
committee's budget targets or which is inappropriately 
considered because a committee has not duly authorized and 
made clear its specific allocations to subcommittees (known 
as 302(b) allocations), 3) Amendments to reconciliation 
bills must be "deficit neutral" (not violating established 
spending and revenue targets), and can be eliminated by a 
motion to strike those provisions calling for new budget or 
entitlement authority, 4) The House is allowed to make 
amendments to reconciliation bills in the event that a 
committee report fails to make its established targets, and 
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5) The use of reconciliation measures to alter Social 
Security payments are not permitted. One of the better 
provisions of the Act, finally, brings "on-budget" all 
previously "off-budget" spending with the lone exception of 
Social Security. 
That concludes a discussion of the entire Gramm/Rudman 
Act. Strict analysis of its provisions will be undertaken 
in the main analysis of this study, but will appear to be 
more clearly presented once a brief statement regarding its 
constitutionality is considered. 
A. Constitutionality 
Whether or not Congress has delegated any of its 
legislative-making capacities to the President is a question 
which will be answered by the u.s. Supreme Court. Since any 
conjecture about the high court's ruling would be premature, 
it is best for this study to simply note that any court 
decision involving Gramm/Rudman will have certain 
consequences which will affect the working of the act. It 
is of interest to note that a Democratic Study Group report, 
and the act itself contain a constitutional backup process 
in the event that the original legislation is voided. It 
provides for a Special Joint Committee to be formed from all 
members of the House and Senate Budget Committees to assume 
responsibility for the sequestering report issued by GAO and 
given to ~he President so that the President is able to make 
the necessary reductions.S 
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IMPACT OF THE BALANCED BUDGET AND EMERGENCY 
DEFICIT CONTROL ACT OF 1985 (THE 
GRAMM/RUDMAN/HOLLINGS 
ACT OF 1985) 
A. Specific Analysis of the Act's Provisions 
Undeniably, the key to final passage of Gramm-Rudman 
was its zero deficit provision. Many congressmen realize 
that they may have not voted for the best balanced budget 
package, but few of them could withstand the election 
pressure which would certainly have resulted from not voting 
in favor of such an act. Since spending levels are proven 
to be of ultimate priority, it is more than likely that 
Congress will strongly attempt to follow this budget 
reduction formula in spite of other political problems 
stemming from its operation. The purpose of this thesis has 
been to examine the impact of Gramm/Rudman on the budget 
process as established by the Budget Act of 1974. As stated 
in the introduction of this thesis, Gramm/Rudman will be 
analyzed for its future potential for achieving the 
original, intended purpose of the 1974 Act, namely, to 
control spending. 
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1. Procedural Constraints of the Act 
There are three main reasons why it would be very 
difficult and probably impossible for Gramm/Rudman to 
achieve its deficit targets. The first reason considers the 
possibility of recession. After two quarterly periods of 
no-growth, a recession could be declared which suspends the 
operation of Gramm/Rudman. Some economists estimate that 
this could occur as early as late 1986 or early 1987 since 
it has been some time since our last recession. It is not 
so much the suspension of the 1985 act for one year that 
would harm the act. What the act must be criticized most 
severely for is its inconsideration of the year of slow 
recovery after the recession (due to probable deficit 
spending the year prior trying to stimulate economic 
growth). Imposing cuts in the first year of recovery (or, a 
tax increase) would halt whatever growth potential existed. 
Even more importantly, however, consider this example 
provided by Hobart Rowen of the Washington Post. If a 
recession forced suspension of the act for fiscal 1987 but 
is followed by a slow recovery in 1988, the deficit target 
established for 1988 is $108 billion. This is not of any 
seeming importance until CBO's deficit projection for such a 
1988 year is realized--$170 billion. The bottom line for 
1988 would mean an across-the-board reduction of $162 
billion.1 Without breaking this down in terms of the 
percentage of across-the-board cuts which would be required 
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by law, two things are certain: 1) These cuts are 
impossible to make all at one time, and 2) Congress could be 
forced to relax its deficit chokehold and disobey 
Gramm/Rudman in order to avoid a post-recession depression. 
Because the 1985 act focuses on spending cuts rather 
than raising revenues, it is very likely that the act would 
encourage agencies, committees, and the like to inflate the 
totals that they propose to Congress. This could 
recognizably soften across-the-board cuts. The tactic would 
not be a new one--it is one recognized as operating under 
the 1974 act as well.2 
The final reason offered for the ultimate failure of 
Gramm/Rudman deficit targets is attributable to the method 
of calculation by which they were devised. In their scheme 
of deficit targets for each fiscal year, CBO estimated these 
figures based on an assumed growth rate of 3.5 percent. 
This is recognized to be a much too generous figure since 
the total growth rate for this year is around 2 percent. 
This makes it all the more difficult to meet the targets. 
It could also mean another very serious problem would occur. 
Should Congress feel inclined to soften the figures, the 
current act states that the President must reject this and 
begin the sequestration process. In a case where deeper-
than-expected cuts are a reality, this has serious 
repercussions for domestic spending. 
The point-of-order enforcement mechanism of 
Gramm/Rudman effectively precludes any amendments or 
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conference resolutions from being introduced which do not 
meet the deficit targets. A three-fifths majority vote is 
required to suspend this rule. All amendments to 
reconciliation bills must be "deficit neutral." Since the 
act has exempted "contract authority," this "point-of-order" 
is unlikely to stop this kind of spending; however, the 
enforcement provision also states that all off-budget 
spending except for Social Security is considered "on-
budget" for this purpose.3 
As previously mentioned, one of the major violations of 
the 1974 act has been its demanding time schedule. As Table 
I points out, the timetable for Gramm/Rudman is even more 
progressive than the 1974 act. A crucial question about the 
1985 act remains to be answered however; the answer to it 
would provide a very handy enforcement provision to the 1985 
act which will force Congress to abide by its timetable. At 
the very latest, August 25 is the day Congress could be 
forced to have its budget house in order. On this day, GAO 
sends its economic report to the President regarding whether 
or not sequestration is necessary--this GAO report is based 
on what Congress plans to do in its budget. Without a 
budget to go by, GAO could issue its report to the President 
based on its best guess. The cuts projected could be even 
more severe than they should be if GAO must rely on its 
guessing method. The President's sequestration order would 
ultimately, in this example, prove to be the only budget 
proposal. Congress could change it if it garners the 
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necessary votes, but it would be largely confined to 
criteria supplied by the executive branch. 
It is very unclear what happens in the 1985 act if 
Congress fails in its responsibility to meet its deadlines. 
The process, then, does appear to have an "auto pilot" 
appearance to it which would very much pass Congress by if 
it cannot agree on a budget. Regard for this prospect by 
Congress may mean that it will, for the first time in a long 
time, meet deadlines. 
2. Political Constraints 
Should sequestration become a reality, it is first 
proper to consider what is exempt from such a blow. Tax 
Expenditures, Social Security benefits, prior contracts 
(eliminating an estimated 38 percent of all defense 
programs), and interest payments on the national debt are 
all exempt. Medicare COLA's are also limited to a 2 percent 
reduction only (1 percent for fiscal 1986).4 Such a 
situation means that the fifty-percent cut suffered by 
domestic spending would-heavily rely on new budget authority 
since COLA's and exemptions keep the percentage of possible 
cuts to a minimum; compare this to defense where at least 38 
percent of current programs continue unaffected. Defense is 
not as likely to be in a sub-zero relationship as are 
domestic programs.S A further insult to this is the fact 
that the act fails to bring in extra accountability for 
programs that are truly wasteful. It has also been 
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suggested that the President could use his authority as 
commander-in-chief to exempt certain defense programs or all 
defense programs for deficit-cutting effects.6 
In the event that sequestration, or, the threat of it 
should become too great, there is always the possibility 
that Congress will resort to revenue raising measures to pay 
for the government they want. Most scholars unanimously 
agree that a tax increase is inevitable given Gramm/Rudman.? 
Whereas Congress has used it as a last means of resort in 
the past, under Gramm/Rudman, tax increases (not necessarily 
of the income variety) may become at least as politically 
acceptable as gutting program after program, year after 
year. 
A feat that it has been able to avoid twice recently, 
Congress could not engage the u.s. in any conflict without 
first declaring war to suspend the deficit reductions. It 
would be completely unavoidable to try to miss all the 
ensuing implications of such an action. This situation also 
serves as the second example of where devastating amounts of 
reductions could be made the year after the suspension of 
the act.8 
Sequestration was placed in Gramm/Rudman as a last 
resort. When invoked, it removes all discretion over 
budgeting from both budget branches. It was for this reason 
that the sponsors of the 1974 act avoided mandatory 
ceilings--they were not seen as being flexible enough to 
allow Congress any budget leeway. Rather than rely on this 
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as a tool to force balanced budgets, however, sequestration 
will undoubtedly be used as a political tool of 
sophistication between the two branches to get the most 
concessions possible. In the fact of the political 
consequences of actually enforcing these non-discretionary 
cuts, Congress and the President may have found the tool for 
budget reconciliation between the two branches. 
Responsibility for assessing the economy, congressional 
and presidential budgets and enforcing deficit reductions 
are shared by CBO and OMB, and ultimately resides in the 
GAO. This act undeniably gives these bodies considerable 
power--depending on their budget prognosis--sequestration 
may be ordered (and, in the case of either CBO or OMB, could 
be ordered by such a large percentage that even when 
averaged against each other could still mean sequestration). 
Additional responsibilities and power also befall the Budget 
Committees as there is only one budget resolution under 
Gramm/Rudman and a very hasty reconciliation process. There 
is also the remote possibility of having to attempt to 
arrive at a formula that would save the budget process from 
sequestration. 
Many scholars (including the Director of CBO) are 
skeptical of the power given to CBO, OMB, and GAO since 
their officials are unelected. These agencies will be under 
direct pressure to conform to their branch's desires, which 
c·ould very well lead to abuse of the Gramm/Rudman formulas 
for sequestration.9 
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As the various problems or potential problems with the 
1985 act are discussed, one central question comes forward. 
Many scholars asked in 1974 when the Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act was passed, "Will Congress really do all that?" 
By and large, the 1974 act has been implemented as intended; 
there are several of its more flexible provisions which have 
not been implemented (timetable, and backdoor spending). 
Scholars argue that a new act is not needed--it only serves 
to confuse the process more. As one article written by Bill 
Bradley states, "It [Gramm/Rudman] is a procedural answer to 
a substantive problem. But the Senate now has all the 
procedures it needs to reduce the deficit. What it lacks is 
the will."10 This argument seems to be one of two crucial 
turning points in budget process history. If Congress is 
serious about budget deficit reduction, this act when 
enforced to the letter will certainly do it. As skepticism 
creeps in about which provisions are strongest and which are 
weakest, the overall enforcement capabilities for the entire 
act suffer. 
B. How the 1985 Act Alters the 1974 
Act Regarding Spending Controls 
The condemning evidence for failure of the 1974 act to 
control spending is provided by the mere presence of 
Gramm/Rudman. Public pressure on Congressmen to take action 
on the national debt caused a very uncertain, weak act to 
become law. Very definitely, the purpose and intent of the 
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1974 act could be realized if the 1985 act is fulfilled. By 
getting budgets in on time, backdoor spending is less likely 
to occur as are continuing appropriations--the two biggest 
abusers of the current system. The new "point-of-order" 
provision ensures that all legislation passed after-the-fact 
is spending neutral. The sequestration process, or the mere 
threat of one, will bring budget totals down most assuredly, 
even if a balanced-budget does not materialize from the 
reductions. As John Ellwood and James Thurber stated about 
the 1974 act, "It allows Congress to 'balance the budget,' 
if it wants; .•.• "11 Perhaps the Gramm/Rudman act is 
finally proof of congressional "want to." 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
An examination of the 1974 act shows it to have an 
overall purpose which has only half been achieved. The 
administrative sections of the 1974 act--establishing CBO 
and the Budget Committees--are undoubtedly successes in the 
forward progress of the budget process. This can also be 
said about limiting the President's right to impound funds. 
These changes have given Congress a complete picture of 
expenses and revenues and who needs these most. What these 
agencies and committees have inadvertently proven, however, 
is the failure of the second half of the purpose of the act: 
spending control. Congressional failures regarding 
deadlines and exemptions under the 1974 act have now been 
brought on-budget by Gramm/Rudman. 
While even its author, Senator Warren Rudman (R-Vt.) 
says that " I doubt that the things that are set out here 
will ever happen," he hopes that changes in procedures in 
the spending control aspect of the budget are significantly 
enough enhanced by Gramm/Rudman as to allow the 1985 act to 
accomplish the remainder of what the Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act attempted to do.1 The act does contain problems 
which ultimately will be addressed in time with the act: 
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Will the budget be balanced, will defense be cut as much as 
Congress wants and domestics spared somewhat from any 
further disabling reductions, and will there be more tax 
increases or declared wars? While the answers to these 
questions are not for the best so far as Congress is 
concerned, the remainder of the 1985 act is good news for 
Congress and spending control. Backdoor spending is largely 
on-budget now and hopefully can be made to stay that way 
with sequestration and points-of-order. It is not unanimous 
that giving more power to OMB and the budget committee is 
wise; but, it is preferable to the status quo and further 
Presidential assumptions of the budget process power. The 
committees and GAO are closely supervised and could be 
compromised to perform well under the act if Congress will 
fully enforce the act (as can committees who inflate their 
budget totals to withstand sequestration-like reductions). 
Subcommittees are guaranteed that spending for their needs 
will be awarded to them by the fact that "302(b)" 
allocations are binding and must be made as quickly as 
possible. This process can only strengthen the spending 
controls by adding to a completed total rather than waiting 
for completed appropriations and the like to push the total 
upward while no one is looking. 
The two looming questions of congressional will and 
action in a timely manner appear to be answered in the 
affirmative. Targeted as a failure for years, the 1974 act 
can easily be redeemed as a good first step by Gramm/Rudman. 
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Although not all of Gramm/Rudman is guaranteed to work 
precisely for even the first thousand miles, the 1985 act 
changes the budget process in many ways for the 
better--deficit reduction and spending control. The 
implications of what this means for the budget process 
itself are even better. 
Given the fact that no law works precisely as it was 
intended, the implications of the 1985 act are not as far 
reaching as most scholars charge. Congress will now reach 
toward lower budget totals and get them. While, for many 
reasons, a balanced budget by 1991 seems unlikely, 
Gramm/Rudman assures that no further significant budget 
outlay growths will occur until the economic times for it 
are better. Even in recession and war times, the act 
assures the fact that only "controlled" growth happens. 
This act ultimately has the effect of strengthening 
Congress in, what the 1974 act demonstrated, were weak 
areas: backdoor spending, continuing resolutions, hidden 
off-budget expenses, CBO and Budget Committee powers of 
enforcement, congressional "want to," the length of time 
taken to complete the budget process, and congressional 
unification for Presidential veto overrides. The primary 
concern about whether procedural budget changes can 
effectively bring spending control via statutory legislation 
seems to be about 70-80 percent solved with Gramm/Rudman. 
It can only be supposed that this same percentage of 
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l"The Politics of Panic: Pay Now or Pay Later," 
Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1985, at 1, sec. II, col. 1. 
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